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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction in the district
court. This court has jurisdiction as this is the original appeal
from a district court conviction.

Defendant was convicted by a

jury on a lesser included second degree felony and a third degree
felony. The Defendant was sentenced 0-5 years at the State Prison
after the second degree felony was reduced pursuant to a 402
motion. No sentence was imposed on the third degree felony because
the court found both charges resulted from a single criminal
episode.

The Defendant was acquitted of all other charges.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL

1.
2.

Does the newly discovered evidence warrant a new trial?
Should

the

court

have

given

the

lesser

included

instruction on communications fraud to obtain something other than
something of monetary value?
3. Should the court have given both the communications fraud
instruction for something other than for value and the unlawful
acts of a director instruction?
4.

Should the court have required the State to prove an

affirmative grant of authority by Mountain Oil to establish the
Defendant as an agent?
5. Should the court have allowed the prosecutor to extend "on
or about October 21, 1986" back over the years to 1979?
6.

Should the court have given Defendants instruction on

proof beyond "any" reasonable doubt?
4

IMPORTANT

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Statutes:
UCA 76-1-402(3)
UCA 76-10-706
UCA 76-10-1801
The relevant portions of the foregoing statutes are quoted
within the body of the brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case. The Defendant was originally charged
with three counts: communications fraud, a first degree felony;
theft, a second degree felony; and unlawful acts of a director, a
third degree felony.
After a trial to a jury the Defendant was found guilty of
unlawful acts of a director, a third degree felony and a lesser
included offense communications fraud a second degree felony. The
Defendant was acquitted of all other charges.
The Defendant was a clerk for Mountain Oil Company. He was so
employed from September, 1961 until the fall of 1986. There were
no job descriptions or policy manuals or memos of procedures.
(Transcript Volume IV page 683.)
officer or director of Mountain Oil.

The Defendant was never an
(Transcript Volume IV page

685.)
Paul Callister was the president of Mountain Oil.

Jan

Callister was the secretary/treasurer. Robert Dalton was the vicepresident/executive manager.

The Callisters and their family,
5

owned Mountain Oil as a minor part of their oil business holdings.
They were absentee owners and managers. Robert Dalton was the day
to day operations officer in charge.(Transcript Volume I page 120
and page 143.)
In 1981 the method of paying gasoline taxes changed for
Mountain Oil.

In that same year there was a gas leak at the Ogden

plant that saw a loss of 40,000 gallons of gasoline that washed
into the sewers of west Ogden. The Mountain Oil management covered
up the leak including the loss of inventory to prevent the EPA from
determining the source of the contamination. (Transcript Volume IV
page 696.)
As a result of all of these problems and others at the end of
the year, the Mountain Oil accountant, Don Murphy and Mr. Becker
differed in balances of $221,000.

This was not lost money but

errors in accounts payable and inventory.

Mr. Becker found

$140,000 of the error over the next few months. The other $70,000
in misidentified inventory or accounts payable he was sure would
turn up eventually.

(Transcript Volume IV page 694 to page 696.)

Mr. Becker from that time until May of 1986 did not reconcile
the check book but estimated the balances accounting for the
$70,000.

(Transcript Volume IV page 692 line 16.)

Robert Dalton

had complete authority in the company to make whatever decisions he
desired

including

borrowing

$100,000

to

ease

cash problems.

(Transcript Volume I page 164.)
Dalton developed health problems and became a heavy drinker.
Dalton also ceased carrying on his daily responsibilities including
6

the monitoring of inventories. (Transcript Volume IV page 704 line
5 to line 14.)

Dalton never established any inventory controls.

There was no way of knowing the inventory. The Defendant estimated
the inventories when Dalton ceased to do them.

(Transcript Volume

IV page 712 line 8 to line 22.) Robert Dalton was the Defendant's
immediate supervisor and boss.

He reported the problems to him.

(Transcript Volume IV page 706 line 13 ff.)
After deregulation the oil business became very tight. There
was an extreme cash crunch as margins and volumes shrank.

Robert

Dalton was aware of the problems and would not report to the
Callisters for a cash infusion, but instead opted to borrow from a
local bank to try and solve the cash flow problem.

(Transcript

Volume IV page 701.) As the cash crunch increased Mr. Becker would
write checks to creditors including various taxing agencies and
send them when there was money to whom ever was yelling the
loudest.

(Transcript Volume IV page 701.)

The other clerical staff reported that they saw Dalton reach
in and take cash periodically from the cash drawer.
only saw this on two occasions.

John Becker

(Transcript Volume I page 168.)

They were times he was informed that Dalton was traveling with the
Callisters.

Becker did not know what arrangement Dalton had with

the Callisters.

(Transcript Volume I page 169.)

In November of 1986 John Becker went to Paul Callister and
told him he could not work under the conditions he was.

He

informed of the $221,000 error in the accounting and that he had
found $140,000 of it. He also informed him that no one was running
7

the company, especially Dalton.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

A new trial is warranted because of newly discovered

evidence.
a. The prosecutor entered a plea arrangement with a codefendant to purchase testimony against the Defendant.

That

arrangement was not revealed to the Defendant.
b. The principal witnesses against the Defendant entered
a

settlement

agreement

relieving

each

other

of

substantial

financial liability the day before the trial. That arrangement was
known to the prosecutor and was not disclosed to the Defendant.
c.

It appears that the foregoing

information was

intentionally kept from the Defendant.
2.

The communications fraud described in UCA 76-10-1801 (e)

is not a lesser included offense of UCA 76-10-1801 (f).
a. The State requested the lesser included offense over
the objection of the Defendant.
b. The instruction given by the court requires the proof
of additional elements.
3. Communications fraud as defined in Jury Instruction No. 11
contains the identical elements as the charge of bad acts of a
director defined in Jury Instruction No. 16 as found by the jury.
a.

The Defendant was entitled to have only the lesser

charge go to the jury.
b.

The instructions were confusing and used the same
8

words with different meanings to describe potentially different
crimes.
4.

The court erred in not requiring the prosecutor to prove

a grant of authority to specifically create an agency.
a.

The court failed to define the key term in defining

agent, "authorized to act."
b.

The court confused the jury by using respondeat

superior language in some of its definitions.
5.

The court erred in allowing the prosecutor to argue that

"on or about" covered years and even decades.
a.

The communication fraud is alleged to have occurred

on October 21f 1986.
b.

No communication by the Defendant took place on

October 21, 1986.
c.

The prosecutor was able to argue and use in evidence

every alleged communication of a decade prior.
6. The court erred in not allowing the Defendant's requested
instruction of reasonable doubt.
a. The Defendant requested that the standard be defined
as proof beyond any reasonable doubt.
b.

There is danger of confusion in the juries mind of

proof beyond a (singular) doubt and proof beyond "any" reasonable
doubt, especially in a complex case.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
9

BECAUSE

OF

SUBSTANTIAL

NEWLY

The newly discovered evidence in the present case is two fold.
Mountain Oil Company, Paul Callister individually, Jan Callister
individually and Robert Dalton executed a document dated April 4th,
1989 entitled

"Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release." (See

District Court file # 891919454 page 171 to 176.)
Robert Dalton misrepresented his plea bargain on the stand.
The prosecutor failed to correct Dalton's false representation.
Paul Callister and Jan Callister failed to disclose their deal with
Dalton.

Their deal led to the Callisters avoiding substantial

individual tax liability.
The prosecutor failed to correct the Callisters' misleading
statement or disclose to the defense the inducements and financial
considerations between the State's principal witnesses.
The Supreme Court has recently taken up the issue of new
trials in the case of State

v. Worthen,

(Utah 1988) 765 P.2d 839.

The Court gave its interpretation of Rule 24 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure found in UCA 77-35-24 which states in subparagraph (a),
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there
is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect
upon the rights of a party.
The Worthen Court gave a synopsis of the existing law. A new
trial is justified if the newly discovered evidence clarifies a
fact that was contested and resolved against the movant. (State
Cooper,

201 P.2d 769.)

v.

Or the new evidence may have changed the

outcome of the trial. (State

v.

Swain,

541 P.2d 5.)

impeachment testimony is not enough. (State
10

v. Brown,

Generally,
48 Ut

279.)

For impeachment evidence to be the basis of a new trial the
evidence must have direct bearing on the issues at trial.

The

impeachment evidence must be such that it would be helpful to the
jury in determining the facts of the case.
POINT TWO
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO KNOW OF THE FINANCIAL DEAL
BETWEEN THE STATE'S PRIMARY WITNESSES AND DALTON'S PLEA BARGAIN
The State is under an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory
or potentially exculpatory information to the Defendant.
an affirmative obligation even if there is no Brady
State

v.

process

Carter,
requires

707 P.2d
a

at

662,

prosecutor

This is

request.

In

the Utah Court stated "due

to

disclose

even

unrequested

information which is or may be exculpatory."
In the present case the Defendant filed two separate discovery
requests and a bill of particulars.

A request was made for

exculpatory information as well as all statements of Robert Dalton.
In

Worthen

the

Court

stated

that

the

Brady

obligation

is

affirmative and ongoing.
Mr. Dalton was questioned by Counsel concerning his plea
bargain and its terms. Neither Dalton nor the prosecutor disclosed
at trial or in response to Defendants discovery requests that
Dalton had cut a deal with Paul Callister, Jan Callister and
Mountain Oil Company to free Dalton from financial claims by the
Callisters.

(See District Court file # 891919454 page 171 to 176.)

Dalton was released by the Callisters individually and by Mt. Oil
of all liability claimed in Bankruptcy cases 88A-00699 and 88C06067.

Additionally Dalton was released from liability under a
11

civil action filed in the Second Judicial District for Weber County
Civil No. 99316 by the Callisters.
This agreement was signed April 4th, 1989, immediately prior
to the commencement of John Becker's trial.

Even though the

document

the

was

executed

before

Becker's

trial

Callister's

attorneys did not mail it to the individuals requiring notice in
the bankruptcy actions, one of whom was John Becker, until April
21, 1989, after Becker's trial.

(See District Court file #

891919454 pages 180, 181 and 183.)
The prosecutor was aware of the details of the arrangements
between

Dalton

and

the

Callisters.

(See Dalton

sentencing

transcript page 13 at District Court file # 891919454 page 185.)
The prosecutor never revealed he had cut a bargain for Dalton's
testimony that required the State to acquiesce in 402 treatment of
Dalton, thus allowing him to escape at the end of probation with
only a class B misdemeanor.
The

treatment

of

Mr.

Dalton

at

sentencing

extraordinary and should have been revealed.

is

equally

It appears that the

plea was made in a manner to prevent the Defendant from being
present. Mr. Dalton plead to his charges the day before the trial
of Mr. Becker.

Mr. Dalton did not plead on a regular law and

motion calendar but at a hurriedly arranged appointment.

Mr.

Dalton was sentenced or rather granted 402 treatment after the
trial of Mr. Becker.
Sentence was not imposed meaning that the charges will become
misdemeanors in due course.

The prosecutor recommended to Adult
12

Probation and Parole that "he not serve any jail time, not one
day." (District Court file # 891919454 page 186 line 14-16).

The

Court imposed a thirty day jail sentence with work release.

The

State further agreed to a restitution figure to be set between
$9,000 and $14,000, a far cry from the hundreds of thousands
claimed against Dalton in the civil actions.

(District Court file

# 891919454 page 187 lines 1 7 - 2 1 . )
The State agreed to remain silent at the time of sentencing
acquiescing in the sentence requested by Dalton.

(See Dalton

sentencing transcript page 27.) Such an agreement was not revealed
by Mr. Dalton on the stand.
through page 518.)

(Transcript Vol. Ill page 516 line 21

Mr. Dalton when specifically asked what the

plea bargain arrangement was stated the deal was:
1) the two major charges would be reduced to third degree
felonies;
2) the theft charge would be dropped;
3) he would be sentenced only on one charge;
4) he would testify against Becker.
Even if the information was not intentionally withheld from
the Defendant the effect was the same. Dalton's false description
of the payment

for his testimony was

not corrected

by the

prosecutor. The jury had a right to know of the heavy inducements
offered to Mr. Dalton to comport his testimony with that of the
Callisters.
Paul Callister upon being questioned by Counsel, as to his
financial interest in putting the blame on Becker and avoiding tax
13

liability never divulged he had released Dalton from all past,
present and future, known and unknown liabilities. (District Court
file # 891919454 page 175)
The only witnesses against the Defendant, on the vital issues
of the charges the jury returned guilty verdicts, were Mr. Dalton
and the two Callisters. The Defendant and the jury had a right to
know that those witnesses were in collusion, trading financial
inducements involving the prosecutor in plea arrangements the day
before the trial of John Becker in order to attempt to fix blame on
Mr. Becker and name him a scapegoat.
It is inconceivable that nothing was mentioned of these
transactions and the plea arrangement.

These men negotiated

immediately before they testified against the Defendant, The State
was a party to these negotiations as evidenced by the plea bargain
with Dalton. The prosecutor was aware of the whole agreement as he
heard it recited by Dalton's attorney at his entry of plea the day
before Becker's trial began. (Dalton sentencing transcript page 12
& 13 at District Court file # 891919454 page 184 line 22 to page
185 line 13.)
The withholding of this vital information from the Defendant
represents a denial of due process.

Concealing the financial

benefits derived from a conviction of the Defendant by the three

major witnesses

is

unconscionable.

No legitimate

purpose

was

served by the withholding of this information.
The Callisters and Dalton were the only individuals who
testified that Becker was a director of Mountain oil even though
14

all of the documentary evidence admitted at trial was to the
contrary.
The credibility of these witnesses would have been severely
compromised had Defense Counsel been able to make the jury aware of
the financial agreement between these individuals. Especially when
this agreement was reduced to writing the day before trial.

It

seems apparent there has been an affirmative effort to prevent the
defense from having this information prior to trial.
a)

Dalton's change of plea was scheduled at a special time.

b) Callisters' attorneys held the agreement and mailed it to
the bankruptcy matrix, which includes John Becker, only after
Becker's trial was finished.
c) The prosecutor did not correct Dalton's false statement as
to the plea bargain he had made.
d)

Neither of the Callisters revealed their financial deal

with Dalton for his testimony.
Mr. Becker is entitled to a new trial. The credibility of the
witnesses against him is devastated in light of the compromises
that have been made to secure Mr. Dalton's testimony and to cover
up the Callisters' own financial advantage from a conviction. The
jury found Mr. Becker not guilty on all three theft charges. The
convictions entered were only on the charges that involved the
direct testimony of the Callisters and Dalton.

The Defendant had

a right to make the jury aware of the financial deal going on
between the primary witnesses and the State as the trial began.
The Defendant had an absolute right to know of the arrangement.
15

The

knowledge

that

the principal witnesses

against

the

Defendant had so much to gain from a conviction of the Defendant
and that they had affirmatively cut financial deals to that end is
powerful exculpatory evidence.

It is this very kind of evidence

Defendant's discovery requests were aimed at uncovering, (District
Court file # 891919454 page 5 and 47,), the very evidence the
prosecutor chose to coverup.
POINT THREE
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD ON WHICH THE JURY CONVICTED THE
DEFENDANT IS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
FRAUD CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN
OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS.
UCA 76-1-402 defines the types of offenses that my be charged
as lesser included offenses.

There are only three statutorily

defined ways a charge may have lesser included offenses.
a) It is established by proof of the same or a less than
all of the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense charged; or
b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy,
or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an
offense otherwise included therein; or
c)
It is specifically designated by a statute as a
lesser included offense.
The second and third descriptions are not relevant to this
case.

UCA 76-10-1801 does not designate by statutory mandate any

lesser included offenses.

The legislature has been plain in

declaring their intent in identifying lesser included offenses.
For comparison see UCA 76-5-201 (2) defining criminal homicide.
It is equally obvious that the lesser included given by the
Court is not an attempt or some other form of preparation to commit
16

the charged offense.
The case law requires a two fold test under paragraph (a):
1.

The trial court must first decide whether the offense is

established by proof of the same or fewer than all of the elements
required to establish the commission of the offense charged.
2. The court must consider the evidence to determine whether
the greater-lesser relationship exists between

the specific

variations of the crimes actually proved at trial. State
780 p.2d

1233

(Sup Ct 1989.)

State

v.

Hill,

727 P.2d

221

v.

Young,
(1986).

A stricter standard applies when the State requests a lesser
included, than when the Defendant requests a lesser included
instruction.

In this case the Defendant objected to the lesser

included instructions. (Transcript Volume IV page 799 Line 5 to
line 10.) Then both the legal elements and the actual evidence or
inferences needed to demonstrate those elements must necessarily be
included within the original offense charged.

An instruction

on

the lesser offense should be given at the prosecution's request
only if the greater offense could not be committed without also
committing the lesser offense. State

v.

Hansen,

732 P.2d

127

(1986).

UCA 76-10-1801 provides a neat scheme of classification in
ascending order from a class B misdemeanor when the money or
property involved has a value of less than $100.00 to a first
degree felony for property obtained in excess of $100,000.00. The
glaring exception is in paragraph (e) which makes it a second
degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud
17

is other than money or something of value.
This creates the difficulty of having two second degree
felonies within the classification scheme.

The test of whether

this is a lesser included offense is, "does the crime on which the
jury convicted require proof of less than all of the facts required
by the charge in the information?" The answer is a resounding nol
It requires the proof of additional facts.
The sub-paragraphs of section 1801 are easy to compare and the
differences become readily apparent when they are laid out side by
side with (f) and (d) in proper descending order and (e) laterally
placed as it should logically be.
(f) a first degree felony
when the value of the property,
money or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is
$100,000 or more.
(d) a second decree felony
when the value of the property,
money or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is more
than $10,000 but does not
exceed $100,000.

(e) a second degree felony when
the object of the scheme or
artifice is other than the
obtaining
of
something of
monetary value,

The amount of money that is alleged to have been taken is the
variable element between the charge in the information and all of
the subparagraphs of 1801 except subparagraph (e).
It is easy to understand how if the state failed to prove a
fraud of $100,000 they may still have by a lesser proof proved
$10,000 or each successive lesser amount down to $100.
Sub-paragraph (e) however does not flow from a lesser proof.
It requires the proof of a separate element, namely the proof of an
object of the fraud of something other than something of value. It
18

is not a lesser proof but the proof of a different element.
An analogy may be made to the different categories of theft.
The degree of the crime depends on the value of the property taken.
However, sub-paragraph (e) would be like throwing robbery in as a
lesser included of theft. The crimes are related, even similar but
at least one additional element is required of each crime.
A Venn diagram is helpful. Imagine a circle containing all of
the items of property with a value from $1.00 to over $100,000. If
the circumference of the circle contains all values up to and
including over $100,000 then any value less than $100,00 will
occupy a smaller circle wholly contained within the original large
circle.

All of the lesser values of property that may be proved

are within the circle and therefore are lesser and included.

The

facts to prove something "without monetary value are outside of the
circle and therefore are neither lesser nor included.
The facts that would constitute proof of sub-paragraph (e) are
not merely a failure to prove sub-paragraph (f) but are a different
set of facts altogether. Sub-paragraph (e) does not flow down from
the original charge containing sub-paragraph (f). It is over to
the side of the diagram, outside of the circle.
and it is not included.

It is not lesser

The legislature's intent to make sub-

paragraph (e) a lateral related crime is apparent because it made
two second degree felonies in the classification structure.
The facts of the present case do not support the inclusion of
sub-paragraph (e) .

There was no evidence offered as to what the

other object of the scheme or artifice to defraud may have been.
19

Even the prosecutor could not come up with some object other than
something of value. In describing this instruction the prosecutor
said:
then it's a communications fraud in the second degree because
his objective is to obtain something other than monetary value.
What that is I don't know, but if that's what you conclude, that he
wasn't getting any money, then it becomes a second degree
communications fraud. (Transcript Volume V at page 907 line 14 to
18. emphasis added)
Inclusion of sub-paragraph (e) of section 1801 allows the jury
to do just what the prosecutor asked them to do speculate wildly
about a possible objective.
Instruction No. 11 (See District Court file # 891919454 page
104) should not have been given.
offense of the offense charged.
in UCA 76-1-402.
set forth in State

It is not a lesser included

It does not meet the test set out

The instruction does not meet the requirements
V. Young or State

v.

Hansen.

The prejudice suffered by the Defendant is that he is required
to defend against what is essentially a new charge.
confusing

to

the

jury.

It

allows

the

jury

to

It is

resort

to

speculation. The matter is compounded by the prosecutor's call in
closing argument for them to speculate as to the object of any
scheme if it was not money. No evidence was received for anything
other than the allegation that the Defendant was taking money or
was an accomplice with someone else receiving money.
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 11.
POINT FOUR
THE CRIME OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD ON WHICH THE JURY FOUND THE
DEFENDANT GUILTY, AS DEFINED IN JURY INSTRUCTION 11 CONTAINS THE
SAME IDENTICAL ELEMENTS AS THE CRIME THE JURY CONVICTED THE
20

DEFENDANT OF COMMITTING AS DEFINED IN INSTRUCTION 16.
The crime of "Communications Fraud" and the crime of "Unlawful
Acts of a Director" appear on their face to require different
elements.

In

the

present

case,

however,

the

elements

necessarily found by the jury make the elements identical.

as
The

findings of the jury are contained in the various verdicts they
rendered.
The material elements of " Communications Fraud" defined in
Instruction 11 of the jury instructions are:
3) devised a scheme or artifice,
4) for the purpose of:
a) defrauding another; or
b) to obtain from another money, property, or anything of
of value.
5) by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions; and
6) on or about October 21, 1986,
7) communicated directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice;
8) the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other
that the obtaining of something of monetary value.
The evidence mustered to support the third element alleging a
"scheme or artifice" was the allegation that the Defendant "made
false entries in books, reports or statements of the corporation."
As a necessary and explicitly argued portion of the State's case
the

scheme

or

artifice

was

a
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"director,

officer

or

agent"

authorized to act making false entries in books, reports or
statements of the corporation.
The fourth element has two disjunctive possibilities.

The

first is the Defendant intended "to obtain from another money,
property, or anything of value." The jury found this branch of the
disjunctive to be not true.

The Defendant was acquitted of all

charges involving theft or taking either for himself or as an
accomplice

for

Robert

Dalton.

The

jury

necessarily

and

specifically found the Defendant did not receive anything of
monetary value under three separate verdicts.
The

fifth

fraudulent

element

pretenses,

requires

the

representations,

Defendant

"by

promises, or

false or
material

omissions" carried out the purpose of element four. The false acts
claimed by the State are the false entries in the books, reports or
statements of the corporation.
The time element requiring the events of the communications
fraud to have occurred on October 21, 1986 was expanded by the
Court

over

the

objections

of

the

Defendant

to

allow

an

interpretation that the events of the communication tracked back
over earlier time periods as alleged in the "Unlawful Acts of a
Director" charge.
Element

seven

requires

a

communication.

The

only

communication alleged by the State is the claimed false entries
into the books and records.

There was no evidence of any other

communication, nor was any other communication alleged.
The eighth element in the lesser included "Communications
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Fraud" substitutes an intent to defraud for some purpose other than
the obtaining of money.

As found by the jury, this element is the

same as "with the intent to injure or defraud the corporation."
The scheme or artifice to defraud argued by the State is in
its essence the making of false entries in books and reports by a
"director, officer, or agent" of the corporation.
The State in order to prove the "Communications Fraud" has
relied upon an agent with an intent to injure making false entries.
There is no additional element required by the
Fraud."

"Communications

The "scheme or artifice" argued by the State was the

Defendant as a "director, officer or agent" made false entries in
the corporation's books.
This may be illustrated graphically as follows:
ELEMENTS OF

ELEMENTS OF

"ACTS OF DIRECTOR OR AGENT"

"COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD"
3)
devised
artifice,

or

2) as a director, officer or
agent of a corporation; 3) made
false entries in books...

a) defrauding another; or

4) with the intent to injure or
defraud the corporation.

a

scheme

4) for the purpose of:

b) to obtain from another
money, property, or anything of
value.

Found
not
element.

guilty

of

this

5) by means
of
false or
fraudulent
pretenses,
representations, promises, or
material omissions; and

3) made false entries in books,
reports or statements of the
corporation;

6) on
1986,

Court over objection allowed
State to argue longer time
period.

or

about

October

21,

7) communicated directly or
indirectly with any person by
any means for the purpose of

3) made false entries in books,
reports or statements of the
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executing
artifice;

the

scheme

or

corporation,

8) the object of the scheme or
artifice to defraud is other
than the obtaining of something
of monetary value.

The

aiding

instruction.

and

abetting

4) with the intent to injure or
defraud,

element

is

identical

for each

Even though the two differing crimes may have

differing elements in the abstract the elements found in this case
by this jury are identical.
The lesser included instruction on "communications fraud" for
something other than for value did not belong in this case. It was
given over the objection of the Defendant. (Transcript Volume IV
Pages 781, 795 and at Volume V at page 909.)

The introduction of

this charge invariably led to the confusion that the jury made
manifest in its verdict.
The Defendant was prejudiced by both charges being given by
instruction to the jury. The verdicts the jury returned reinforce
the conclusion they were confused by the instructions. A different
result likely would have been reached without the inclusion of the
lesser included charges.
POINT FIVE
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NO. 16 AND 17.
These instructions deal with the elements of the crime of
unlawful acts by a director, officer or agent and the definition of
director and agent.
The court defined director in Instruction No. 17 as "any of
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the persons having by law direction or management of the affairs of
a corporation, by whatever name the persons are described in its
charter or known by law." (See District Court file # 891919454 page
111).
In Instruction No. 18 (See District Court file # 891919454
page 112) the court quotes the code that a person cannot be a
director without his consent.

There is no evidence that John

Becker was ever elected or appointed a director of Mountain Oil.
Paul Callister's testimony was to the effect John Becker was
elected a director December 4, 1979. The minutes for that meeting
(Exhibit No. 10) show a gift of one share of stock to Becker
because of long time service to the company. (Transcript Volume I
page 116 to 123.)
Mr.

Callister

finally

admits

that

there

was

never

an

acceptance by Mr. Becker, never an election or an appointment of
mr. Becker that is recorded in any set of minutes or any filing
with the State of Utah.
Jan Callister was the secretary/treasurer of the company and
kept the minutes

of the directors meetings

and

shareholders

meetings from the late 1960 's. (Transcript Volume II page 206 line
24 to page 207 line 13 and Volume I page 120 line 12 to line 18.)
There are no minutes of any meeting in which John Becker was made
a director. (Transcript Volume II page 205 line 18 to page 206 line
2.)

There are however, minutes when Jan Callister and Robert

Dalton were all made directors.
line 3 to line 23.)
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(Transcript Volume II page 206

There is no evidence of John Becker being a director except
the verbal statements of Paul Callister that are belied by the
minutes of the actual meetings kept by his brother, Jan Callister.
Likewise there is no evidence that heard that John Becker was
an officer of the corporation.

The president was Paul Callister,

the vice-president/general manager was Robert Dalton and the
secretary/treasurer was Jan Callister.

No evidence was ever

offered that John Becker was anything other than a bookkeeper.
The issue centers on the definition of agent.

The court

defined agent in Instruction No. 17 as "any director, officer, or
other person authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or
association."
The Defendant objected to this definition and argued for a
definition that required the corporation to bestow or create the
agency by some act.

The court accepted the defense argument that

mere employment does not constitute agency. (Transcript Volume IV
page 799.)
Agency requires an act of creation.

In the typical case the

principal endows the agent with the authority to act.

The

legislature has required many agency relations to be in writing;
insurance sales, UCA 31A-23-309; corporate process agent UCA 16-1011; durable power of attorney, UCA 75-5-501.
An employee is not automatically an agent of a corporation.
In the present case this is very clear. Mr. Becker was an employee
for a company that had no job description for him other than
bookkeeper.

There were no policy or procedure manuals and no
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memo's outlining on going policies.
line 16 to page 131 line 23.)

(Transcript Volume I page 130

Mr. Becker never signed for the

company on any corporate resolution or obligation. (Transcript
Volume I page 121 line 20 to page 122 line 4.)
To claim that Mr. Becker is an agent of the company there must
be some designation of his agency.
constitute him as an agent.

The principal must some how

The Defendant was entitled to an

instruction that affirmatively required the State to prove that the
Defendant was constituted as an agent.
The only person in the Ogden office of Mountain Oil that was
constituted as an agent to act for the company was Robert Dalton.
(Transcript Volume I page 129 line 9 to line 15.)
The usual situation involving principal and agent is where
someone is trying to hold the principal for the acts of the agent.
In this case it is the reverse.
UCA 7-2-201 and 204 are the source of confusion.

These

sections represent the usual situation where the principal is
sought for the acts of the agent.

Agent of a corporation is

defined

employee

"any

director,

officer,

or

other

person

authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or association." (UCA
76-2-201 (1)) The court recognized this definition applied only in
part, however, the court failed to expound on the key term of
"authorized to act."

The court failed to require the State to

prove the grant of authority.
POINT SIX
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO ARGUE THE TERM "ON OR
ABOUT" MEANING MONTHS AND EVEN YEARS.
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The communications fraud charge and the lesser included on
which the jury returned a guilty verdict specify that the crime
took place on the 21st day of October, 1986. (See District Court
file # 891919454 page 66.) No verbal communication was introduced
into evidence that the Defendant made on that day. (See Exhibit
Seven; Minutes of the Director's meeting for October 21, 1986.)
The State relied exclusively on Exhibit Six, the "Mountain Oil
Company Balance Sheet and Income Statement, for August 1986"

as

the communication.
The claimed communication is this financial statement for
August of 1986 that was presented at the director's meeting held on
October 21, 1986.

Mr. Becker is not listed as a director but as

M

others" present.
Mr. Becker did not directly contribute information to the

August, 1986 financial statement.

The actual financial statement

was prepared and generated by Don Murphy. Under cross examination
Murphy admitted that Becker didn't communicate any of the actual
figures.

Murphy further admitted that each of the items reported

in the August financial statement came from Becker's books from
May, which were the last figures he provided. Murphy admitted the
May figures were substantially correct. (Transcript Volume I Page
298 line 21 to page 315 line 18.)
The end result is there were no communications made by John
Becker

on

October

21, 1986

as

alleged

in the

information.

Defendant moved to dismiss this charge and the others at the end of
the

State's

case. The

court

denied
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the

Defendant's motion.

(Transcript Volume III page 488 to page 513.)
The issue was renewed in jury instructions.

The prosecutor

was allowed to add "on or about to the instruction."

(Transcript

Volume IV page 781 line 18 to line 23.) The prosecutor was allowed
to argue that the communications did not have to occur on October
21, 1986 but could have occurred for years before. (Transcript
Volume IV pages 783 to 785.)
The essence of the court's position is to allow the prosecutor
to argue that on or about October 21, 1986, means not only a
financial statement made in September, a reconciliation statement
made in May, but all of such statements made for years before.
(Transcript Volume V page 814 to page 817.)
What communication was made on October 21, 1986, was requested
in the Bill of Particulars. The prosecutor answered by only saying
the August financial was the communication.

(See District Court

file # 891919454 page 37).
The prosecutor admitted separate communications are separate
charges when he said,
As to alleging one date, I think the statute specifically
provides that each separate communication should be a separate
charge. Now, I guess we could have alleged a separate charge
— 50 different charges — or 24 different charges for each
financial statement that was prepared over that two year
period ...(Transcript Volume III page 498 line 1 to line 6.)
The court by allowing the prosecutor to argue all of the prior
financials as communications culminating in the August statement
has allowed him to argue prior claimed bad acts as proof of the
present charge.

It also allows the major element namely a

communication to go without proof on the day charged.
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The
prior

Defendant has been prejudiced.

alleged

communications

to

be

The court has allowed

used

in

proof

of

the

communication element in the information on the date charged. The
statute,

1801 clearly provides that each communication

separate charge.

There would be multiple criminal episodes.

for each financial, each requiring its own trial.

is a
One

The court has

allowed the evidence of all allegations to be used to expand the
"on or about language to cover years.
The Utah appellate courts have allowed "on or about" to mean
one day off, two days off, even four days off, but not a decade.
State

v. Hill,

supra.

If the prosecutor were required to allege each communication
as a separate count each communication could be examined on its
merits. The court has allowed alleged communications from the late
70's and early 80's to be considered. (Transcript Volume II page
297.)

If the charges were brought properly the Defendant would

have defenses of to each of them including asserting the statute of
limitations.

As the court allowed the prosecutor to lump all of

these into one date of October 21, 1986, regardless of when the
actual communication was claimed to have been made, the Defendant
is severely prejudiced.
It is improper and unjust to allow the prosecutor to allege a
date on which a communication occurred and then prove that date by
showing any alleged prior bad communication for a decade before.
POINT SEVEN
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT INCLUDING
INSTRUCTION ON REASONABLE DOUBT
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DEFENDANT'S

REQUESTED

The court refused to include language in the reasonable doubt
instruction

requiring

proof

beyond

any

reasonable

(Transcript Volume IV page 800 line 19 to line 24.)

doubt.

A jury may

well be confused whether it must find proof beyond a (singular)
reasonable doubt or if its duty is to find proof beyond any and all
reasonable doubts.
In a complex case with complex elements that apply differently
to different charges, it is vital for jurors to know the standard
of proof is beyond any and all reasonable doubts.
CONCLUSION
Defendant seeks to have his conviction over turned and the
charges dismissed or in the alternative a new trial granted. This
is a case that involves a small company that has been allowed to
drift without real management for years.

The officers in an

attempt to fix blame and avoid personal tax and other liability
have attempted to find a scape goat. All of the results of years
of poor management are being laid at the Defendant's door.

John

Becker is being charged because he did not go over the head of
Robert Dalton, his immediate boss and report Dalton to Paul
Callister. The Defendant is entitled to a new trial armed with the
collusions of the primary witnesses against him and a properly
instructed jury.

/
Respectfully submitted,
Donald Cr hughes, JrV^l^^
Attorney for Defend^iit/Respondent
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